The reason banks mention most frequently for withdrawing from Federal Reserve membership is the cost of reserve requirements imposed on members relative to reserve requirements of the various states for nonmember banks.
t However, the utilization of Federal Reserve Bank services by member banks must also be considered in an analysis of the costs and benefits of membership. The implications for the costs and benefits of Federal Reserve membership are analyzed on the basis of a survey of services used by member banks that are served by the head office of this Reserve Bank. The Bankers Magazine (Winter 1976), pp. 43-49. 2Requircd subscriptions to Federal Reserve Batik stock by member banks can be considered a type 1 if interest bearing reserve requirement. Member banks must subscribe to stock of their Federal Reserve Banks in aolou, its pn Pt atlunal to their capital and surplus. The annual yield on that stock is six percent. That iate of rettirn was a sigi ufican I i ndii cement to me,nl ers lii p in t lie I 930s an (I I 940s when market interest rates were very low, hi I gi von the niarket interest rates of reel,it years, the y ie 1(1 on Federal Reserve stock is now probalsly a ne, it ral factor iii the c ists an(I lsenefi is of ujeijiIs 'rship. Thcrefiire, Fcde al Reserve Bank xltick is 'jot in clii(led in the foIlowl, i g disc,issi (sit of the reserve hi rden of ulw r banks ir the costs of liens 1 Sc rs}up
Page 2 deposit liabilities, whereas reserve requirements for member banks are graduated so that requirements are lower for smaller banks. The significant difference between the reserve requirements of member and nonmember banks concerns the types of assets they can use to meet their legal reserve requirements.
Membership Attrition
In most states nonmember banks can meet their reserve requirements with vault cash, cash items in the process of collection (CIPC), and demand balanees due from other commercial banks. Member banks can meet their reserve requirements only with vault cash and collected reserve balances at the Federal Reserve Banks.
The reserve burdens of most nonmember banks are reduced substantially because they are permitted to use CIPC to meet state requirements. Their CIPC represent primarily the value of checks they have deposited with correspondent banks for which the correspondents have not yet received payment.
3 On the other hand, when member banks deposit checks with Reserve Banks, they receive credit to their reserve accounts according to a schedule which depends upon the location of the banks on which the cheeks are drawn. Member banks receive immediate credit for some checks, but for others credit is delayed one or two days. The deferred credit schedule approximates the time required for the Federal Reserve System to receive payment for outstanding checks.
To demonstrate the significance of CIPC for the relative reserve burdens of member and nonmember banks, the ratios of CIPC to reserve balances were calculated for a group of 49 member banks that are served by the St. Louis office of the Eighth Federal Reserve District and which regularly clear both local and out-of-region checks through this Reserve Bank. The four largest correspondent banks in the area were excluded from these calculations since their CIPC are exceptionally large in relation to their reserve balances. Average daily reserve balances of those member banks would have been 82.6 percent greater if they could have counted CIPC as part of their reserves.
4 Another indication of the significance of CIPC is Knight's estimate that, on average, only 56 percent of demand balances that banks hold at correspondent banks are collected balances. 5
Another significant difference beiween reserve requirements of states and those of the Federal Reserve is that nonmember banks can meet state reserve requirements with deposits at correspondents. As indicated below, correspondents offer respondent banks higher implicit rates of return on demand balances in the form of services than the implicit returns member AUGUST 1977 banks receive on their reserve balances at Reserve Banks, In addition, in about half of the states, nonmember banks can meet various proportions of their reserve requirements by holding interest earning government securities, and the Federal Reserve enforces its reserve requirements more rigorously than do most states°E mpirical studies support the view that member banks have greater reserve burdens than nonmembers by showing that member banks have higher cash/asset ratios than nonmember banks of the same size, especially among smaller banks.
7 however, these studies do not show in general that the reserves of member banks at Reserve Banks are larger than the demand balances that nonntember banks hold at correspondents. The cash/asset ratios of member banks are higher than those of nonmembers because many member banks hold their required reserves at the Federal Reserve and hold substantial demand balances at correspondent banks.
Therefore, analysis of the cost of Federal Reserve membership involves more than just comparison of reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve with those of the states. It also involves examination of reasons why member banks hold large balances with correspondents. One of the major reasons banks hold demand balances at correspondent banks is to compensate correspondents for their use of services. Thus it is relevant to examine the services that memIn 30 states there are no specified dollar penalties for reserve deficiencies for nonineinber banks.
3 Nonmember banks are officially allowed to count their CIPC as reserves in less than half of the states. However, in the other states nonmembers can count CIPC as reserves by recording all deposits of checks with their correspondents as demand balances due from correspondents, whether the funds are available for their use immediately or with some delay due to the time required for collection. 4 Average daily reserve balances and CIPC were calculated for the period September 9, 1976 , through January 12, 1977 The service to member banks that is the most expensive for Reserve Banks to provide to members is collection of checks. The Federal Reserve System provides the only national system of check collection, through which 13.2 billion checks were cleared in 1976. This represents about 45 percent of all checks written in the nation last year.
Member banks may deposit for credit to their reserve accounts checks drawn on any other domestic bank that remits at par.
8 There is no direct charge to member banks for this service. Since the early 1970s, nonmember banks located in zones served by Regional Check Processing Centers have been pennitted to deposit at Reserve Banks checks drawn upon other banks in their regions. Deposits of such cheeks are credited to the reserve accounts of member banks that serve as correspondents. There is no charge to nonmember banks for this service. Nonmember banks collect out-of-region cheeks through their correspondents. All checks deposited with Reserve Banks must be encoded with bank routing numbers and dollar amounts. Banks depositing more than a certain minimum number of checks must sort cheeks by location of the banks on which the checks are drawn. For each bank that deposited more than five checks with the Reserve Bank, the number of checks deposited in January was multiplied by 12 to get an annual rate, and averages within each size group are reported in column (5)10 A few large banks deposited most of the checks. For instance, the 12 largest banks deposited 79 percent of all checks, and the five largest deposited 74 percent. These figures actually understate the share of checks directly deposited by the largest banks since several of these large banks send checks drawn on banks in other Federal Reserve districts directly to the other Federal Reserve Banks. The survey does not include information on the number of such checks.
Another function involved in check clearing is that of banks paying their Reserve Bank for checks dr'awn upon them (remitting for the Fed's cash letters). The percentages of banks in each group that remit by having their reserve accounts debited are indicated in were 15 member banks that deposited from one to five checks in January. To include those banks in the percentages ill colmnnn (4) Table IV. lug thai InolitIt.'~hirge IIIaiOrit\ of banks with total assets under 8100 milllois clear cheeks tliroiiglt CO crc'spondeflt~.
column (6). Those member banks mlot using this method arrange for the reserve accounts of their correspondents to be debited, the same method of settlement that is used by nonmember banks.
This settlement function is analyzed as a separate service since the method that member banks use for settlement involves costs and benefits which are different from the costs and benefits involved in the method used for clearing checks. If member banks choose to settle through their reserve accounts, they incur transactions costs involved in meeting their weekly required reserves. If they settle through correspondents, they must compensate correspondents for record keeping -and for the transactions costs which they create for their com'respondents.
In most size groups in Table IV , the number of banks that have their reserve accounts debited for checks drawn upon them is greater than the number that deposit checks directly with the Reserve Bank. This is probably because depositing checks directly with the Reserve Bank involves more processing by member banks (encoding and sorting) than corre- Coin and •Gani. ran., I~n.aae One of the important operational functions of Reserve Banks is removing defective currency from circulation and issuing new currency. Reserve Banks provide both member and nonmember banks with coin and currency-, Armored car service for pick up and delivery of coin and cum'rency is smmade available daily at offices of memb erand miontuember banks in metropolitan areas surrounding offices of Reserve Banks and weekly in other areas. Banks not located on armored car routes receive coin and currency from Reserve Banks through the mail. This service is provided to member banks without charge, whereas nonmember banks are charged fees to cover costs, Reserve Banks charge both members and nonnwmbers a fee for wrapped coin to cover the cost of that operation.
Page 6 Information on the coin and currency service used by member banks is presented in columns (7) -(10) of Table I\' . Column (7) indicates that most member banks receive armored car service. Almost all of the others receive Federal Reserve coin and currency scm-vice through the mail (see column 8). The remaining member banks receive money service from correspondents.
When member banks receive money shipments or deposit coin and currency at the Reserve Bank, they can have the Reserve Bank debit or credit their resemve accounts or those of their correspondent banks. Such practices vary among member banks, as indicated in column (9). The method of debiting and crediting for a bank's money service, either through its reserve account or a correspondent account, can be considered a separate aspect of this service, as in the discussion above about settlement for checks drawn upon a member bank.
The degree to which member banks of various sizes use the Federal Reserve's coin and currency service is quantified in column (10) in terms of fees that member banks using this service would be charged as nonmembers. The annual value of coin and currency service to each member bank was calculated at fees charged noninember banks based upon utilization of that service in September, October, and November of last year. For banks in each size group that receive money service from the Reserve Bank, the average annual value of their money service is presented in column (10)," A Reserve Bank service that is offered exclusively to member banks at no charge is wire transferstransferm-ing funds electronically from the reserve account of one member hank to the reserve account of an other mnember bank in the country. tm2 This system is imsed heavily for conducting transactions in the Federal funds market and for making payments for large business customers. Many of the large member banks use the wire transfer service through on-line equipment, initiating and receiving notice of transac-'1 There 'veme not su{ficiem,t data to calculate the fees inesmiher banks receiving coin and currency service through the mail would have bees, ch-ai-ged -for such Innil service -as 'ionmembers. The valmme of the '',nailed-mnotmcy" service for men~-hers was calculated based upon what they would have paid as a mm onm i member fom-the sam'me value of eon, asic 1 em,rre 0ev
shipnments provided through armnored ear service.
rThcme is a charge for tmamisfers of less than S 1,000. Based upon a survey in November and December of last year, many of the banks either initiated no wire transfers or made minimal use of the service.
13 Freq uent users of the wire transfer service are defined as those initiating more than five wire transfers dnring the two month period; column (11) presents the percentage of banks in each size group that initiated wire transfers frequently.
The number of wire transfers originated by frequent users was multiplied by six to get annual rates; averages of those annual rates for frequent users of the service are presented in column (12). These calculations indicate that banks in the largest size group initiated most of the wire transfers. As additional evidence, the four banks that initiated the most wire transfers accounted for 86.8 percent of wire transfers that were sent by all banks in the survey, including those of the infrequent users.
e ping of Sc (I.VTZ f:3.p Reserve Banks hold securities in safekeeping for member banks at no cost to members. Securities are held in two forms:
(1) Certain Federal Government obligations are held at Reserve Banks in book-entry foim. N-o physical debt certificates are issued by the Treasury, but ownership records are kept on the books of the Reserve Banks. Customers of member banks may also hold Federal debt obligations in this form, with the member banks acting as their agents for this service. Ownership of these securities may he changed through wire transfers.
(2) The other form iii which securities are held in safekeeping at Reserve l3anks is that of definitive securities -actual paper evidence of debt obligations (not limited to Federal Government debt). Reserve Banks collect bond coupons for member banks at no charge, and collect matured bonds at no charge other than shipping charges for collection outside Federal Reserve Bank cities. Collected funds are credited to the reserve accounts of member banks.
1~O fthe 233 banks in the survey, 78 initiated no wile transfers di ring that period. All hut three of the banks not using that service had total assets lcss than $35 million. The banks initiating from une to five wire transfers ( 57 in total) are also relatively small; a]l lsul nine had total assets less than $35 million.
Reserve Banks hold, for nonmembers, Federal Government securities that are required as collateral for U.S. Government deposits at those banks. Reserve Banks also accept, from nonmembers, custody of securities that are pledged as collateral to deposits of bankrupt estates. Other than in these two cases, nonmembers are not allowed to keep securities for their own investment account or for the accounts of their customers in safekeeping with Reserve Banks.
Columns (13) - (16) of Table IV present information on securities that member banks hold in safekeeping with the Reserve Bank. Some member banks do not use this service, preferring to hold securities with their correspondents or in their own vaults. Use of the safekeeping service of the Reserve Bank is somewhat related to bank size, with a greater percentage of the larger banks using this service. However, more of the smaller banks use this service than they do the Reserve Bank's check clearing or wire transfer services.
JP;rrowh.tg thin S th.e .Di.scoi.cnt W n.dow
Reserve Banks make loans to member banks for various purposes and durations. In the most common situation, a member bank borrows for only a few days at a time, presumably to adjust its reserve position to unanticipated deposit withdrawals or loan demands. This type of lending is called adjustment credit. Certain member banks with distinct seasonal patterns in loan demand and deposit flows qualify for seasonal borrowing privileges, under which they may borrow fixed amounts from Reserve Banks for several consecutive months. A third category of Federal Reserve lending is einergencq credit, involving loans for extended periods of time to member banks experiencing financial difficulties that make other sources of funds unavailable to them at prevailing market interest rates. Emergency credit is made available at a higher discount rate than the rates for adjustment credit or seasonal lending. In some circumstances emergency credit can he made available to nonmember banks, but at a higher interest rate than emergency credit for member banks.
The discount rate was above the Federal funds rate dining most of 1975 and 1976. Therefore, banks that borrowed at the discount window during those years were generally borrowing to make short-term adjustments to their reserve positions rather than borrowing to profit from a relatively low discount rate, as many banks did in 1974. Banks that are "regttlar" borrowers at the discount window are identified in this paper as those that borrowed in either two different months or for a total of 15 days or more in either of the past two years. These "regular" borrowers are assumed to be relying upon the discount window as an important source of short-term credit.
Only 21 banks are identified as "regular" borrowers (see column (17), Table IV ).
5~N ote that 15 of them had total assets of less than $35 million. Thus, although most member banks do not borrow when the discount rate is above money market rates, the discount window is an important source of short-term credit for several of the smaller member banks.
inca pa.t: sag thC Bean fits o Membership
The benefits of Federal Reserve membership are measured by summing the costs to the Federal Reserve of providing services to member banks and dividing by their respective average reserve balances at the Reserve Bank. This percentage is called an implicit rate of return on reserve balances. Average implicit returns are presented in column (18) of Table  IV . The numerator of this ratio is an estimate of the cost to the Reserve Bank of providing check clearing, money service, and wire transfers. This approach overstates the benefits of membership from these services to the extent that member banks use more of these services at zero explicit prices than they would as nonmembers, paying for services by explicit fees or correspondent balances.
Means of allocating the costs of services to individual member banks are discussed in Table IV . No suitable basis was devised for allocating the costs of safekeeping of securities and credit discount services to individual member banks, but, as indicated in Table III , the three services included in calculations in column (18) -check clearing, coin and currency service, and wire transfers -account for about 95 percent of the costs of services provided. Therefore, allocating just the costs of these three services to member banks provides suitable estimates of the benefits of membership measured in terms of costs of services used.
In all size groups the implicit rates of return on reserve balances are quite low) 5 The highest per- 
nallor Banks
Division of banks into categories of large and small is somewhat arbitrary. For purposes of this discussion small banks are identified as those with total assets less than $50 million (or roughly those in groups 1-10 in Table IV ). were for collected demand balances of respondent banks net of required reserves that correspondent banks must hold against those deposits. In the discussion above, those earnings allowances were converted to a basis of collected balances unadjusted for required reserves by multiplying by one minus the marginal reserve requirement on demand deposits for correspondent banks, which is assumed to be 16.5 percent, the marginal reserve requirement for member banks with deniand deposits greater than $400 million. This adjustment is made to the eamings allowances by correspondent banks to make them more comparable to the implicit returns on reserve balances of member banks calculated above.
17 Comparisons of implicit rctums that member banks receive ou their reserve balances to the earning allowances at correspondent banks understate to some extent the differences in implicit yields on reserve balances and collected demand balances at correspondent banks. This bias results from the fact that correspondents are not charged fees for the Reserve Bank services they use as part of their service to respondent banks, and therefore, do not have to include the costs to the Reserve Banks in offering those services in their implicit charges to respondent banks in order to price their services profitably. An objection might be raised to this conclusion on the basis that correspondent banks must set their implicit charges on services they offer to respondent banks high enough to cover their costs of Federal Reserve membership in terms of foregone earnings on the large reserve balances they must hold. If this objection is valid, it would mean that comparison of implicit returns on reserve balances to earnings allowances at correspondent banks would overstate the differences in yield on reserve balances in terms of services relative to the impllcit yields on demand balances at correspondents. However, this objection is not valid since the earnings allowances reported above equal the earnings allowances front the recent study of accounts analysis at correspondent banks multiplied by one minus the marginal reserve requirement on demand deposits, thus removing this second source of potential bias.
with total assets less than $50 million which make relatively full use of Reserve Bank services. Each of the banks included in this analysis regularly clears local and out-of-district checks directly through the Reserve Bank. There are 34 such banks served by the head office of this Bank. Their total assets as of June 1976 ranged from $8.8 to $49.9 million, with average assets of $27.6 million."' All of these banks receive coin and currency service from the Reserve Bank, and all but three of them initiated wire transfers.
The average implicit return to these banks on their reserve balances is 1.32 percent. Thus, although member banks which utilize Reserve Bank services more fully than average can increase their implicit returns on reserve balances substantially, their implicit returns still will be low relative to the implicit interest rates on collected demand balances at correspondents.
I.
,.~.,
• ',. .~,. 
Given

This
Th Two other banks had these characteristics but were excluded from this analysis because their utilization of services was unusually great. Apparently those banks serve as check processing centers for other banks in their holding companies.
analysis has not explained why most of the smaller member banks make little use of Reserve Bank services. Explanations could be offered for each service separately. For instance, one explanation for why most of the small member banks clear checks through correspondents is the Fed's encoding and sorting requirements. However, a more general explanation, which is supported by the evidence in the sections above, is that most of the smaller member banks find the transactions costs of managing their reserve accounts, while using Reserve Bank services, greater than the benefits derived from using those services.
Use of Reserve Bank check clearing services involves frequent debits and credits to a member bank's reserve account. Having a reserve account debited and credited for money shipments also creates some problems for a member bank in managing its re7erve position. When a member bank orders a currency shipment, its reserve account is debited, but the funds transferred to the bank as vault cash are not counted as part of reserve assets for two weeks. For the current reserve settlement week, the funds withdrawn from the bank's reserve account must in general be replaced with funds from another source in order to meet reserve requirements. Use of other Reserve Bank services -wire transfers, safekeeping of securities, and borrowing through the discount window -involves similar adjustments to the reserve positions of member banks.
Member banks know the average reserve balances they are required to hold during each reserve settlement week at the beginning of the week, and most member banks receive statements daily on the balances in their reserve accounts. Even though the Reserve Banks provide members with this information, member banks incur transactions costs in managing their reserve positions if they are using Reserve Bank services which involve frequent debits and credits to their reserve accounts. Banks using such services must monitor their reserve positions closely, project debits and credits to their reserve accounts, sell assets or borrow funds to avoid reserve deficiencies when there are unanticipated debits, and buy assets or lend funds to avoid large excess reserves when they have sinanticipated credits.
Large banks cope with such reserve management problems by employing specialists in that function. According to the explanation for the behavior of the smaller member banks developed in this section, a large proportion of them prefer not to incur the transactions costs that result from using Reserve l3ank services directly. Instead they prefer to hold relatively idle balances at the Reserve Bank to meet reserve requirements, obtaining services through correspondents and using their demand balances at correspondents as their working balances. As explained above in the discussion of accotmt analysis at correspondent banks, correspondents require respondent banks to hold average demand balances in some proportion to the costs of services they use. llowever, correspondent banks require this balancing out less frequently than once a week, thus allowing their respondent banks more flexibility in the use of their demand balances than Reserve Banks allow members in the use of their reserve balances.
Data from the survey discussed above include several observations which tend to support the hypothesis that many of the smaller member banks avoid using Reserve Bank services because of the reserve management problems that would result. Note in columns (6) and (9) of Table IV that in most size groups snore banks have their reserve accounts debited and credited for money shipments than have their reserve accounts debited for checks drasvn upon them. A member bank orders money shipments in advance and therefore can plan its reserve managenient over a reserve settlement week, taking such entries into consideration. In contrast, debits to a member bank's reserve account in remitting for the Fed's cash letters conic in amounts and with thning that cannot be foreseen accurately. Therefore, one explanation for why more member banks order money shipments through their reserve accounts than settle for checks drawn upon them through their reserve accounts is that debits and credits due to money shipments create smaller transactions costs in managing their reserve positions.
Another observation that supports this viexv is that the smaller banks which do use services involving frequent debits or credits to their reserve accounts tend to use other such services. Use of one such service forces a bank to deal with the problem of managing its reserve account subject to frequent debits or credits. Thus, using other such Reserve Bank services imposes a smaller marginal burden.
There are 58 banks among the 200 smallest in the recent survey that either deposit checks directly with the Reserve Bank or pay for checks drawn upon them throtigh their reserve accounts. Use of these services involves the most frequent and unpredictable debits and credits to reserve accounts. Of these banks, 52, or 89.7 percent, have their reserve accounts debited and credited for money shipments; of the other 142 mem-ber banks among the 200 smallest in the survey, only 69, or 48.6 percent, have their reserve accounts debited and credited for money shipments.
A similar difference in behavior exists among these banks with respect to use of the wire transfer service. Of the same 58 banks, 39, or 67.2 percent, initiated more than five wire transfers during a two-month period, whereas among the remaining 142 banks, only 33 banks, or 23.2 percent, initiated \vire transfers that frequently. Many of the member banks that did not initiate wire transfers through the Reserve Bank probably did so through correspondents.
The discussion above indicates a preference among the smaller member banks for holding relatively idle balances at Reserve Banks to meet their reserve requirements and holding more active demand balances at correspondents which serve as their working balances. Results in Table V , using observations for all Eighth District member banks, reflect such a pattern of behavior, One measure of activity in reserve balances and demand balances at correspondents is the standard deviation of daily balances divided by the mean of daily balances. For banks in each size group cxchiding the 25 largest banks, their demand balances at correspondents are, on average, more variable than their reserve balances, indicating that the smaller member banks tend to hold relatively idle balances with the Reserve Bank and use their demand balances at correspondents as their working balances.
Another measure of variability in daily balances presented in Table V is the average number of days that balances in an account (lid not change from the previous day. To indicate the limits on these numbers, the data used cover 126 days, and the minimum number of days a bank's reserve balance could remain unchanged is 36. due to weekends and holidays. Many of the smaller member banks leave their reserve balances unchanged for several clays in a row. The number of days reserve balances remained unchanged averaged 76.5 among the 60 smallest banks and tended to decline as bank size increased. The number of days demand balances at correspondents remained unchanged were approximately the minimum for banks in all size groups.
Member banks that use the services of correspondents, instead of the services provided by their Reserve Banks, must hold substantial demand balances at correspondents to compensate for the services they use. Thus, many member banks bear double reserve burdens, meeting the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve and holding demand balances at correspondents that are large enough to exceed the reserve balances that would be required of them as nonmember banks.
In most states nonmember banks can meet their reserve requirements with demand balances at correspondents and CIPC. The last column of Table V indicates that in all size groups Eighth District member banks hold average daily demand balances at correspondents plus CIPC that are larger than their average daily reserve balances at the Reserve Bank. The ratio of demand balances at correspondents plus CIPC to reserve balances is especially high among the smallest member banks and the largest member banks in Table \7 , the large correspondent banks having especially large CIPC.'°T hese observations do not necessarily imply that most member banks would hold the same level of demand balances at correspondents if they became nonmembers. Several studies show that nonmember banks hold larger demand balances at correspondents than member banks of the same deposit size.
2°T he observations in the last column of Table V do indicate that most member banks hold assets that would count as reserves if they were nonmember banks which are larger than their current reserve balances at the Reserve Bank.
he analysis above indicates that there are substantial costs associated with Federal Reserve membership, and yet, as indicated in Table I , many of the banks in the smaller size groups are members of the Federal Reserve. Access to the Federal Reserve services discussed above does not provide sufficient benefits to offset the opportunity costs of required reserves. Therefore, the remaining I tThe numerator of this ratio is demand balances at correspondents plus CIPC for the following reasons. One reason concerns the dill erences among member banks in the way they record deposits at correspondents. Some banks record the value of deposits to accounts at correspondents as CIPC uotil the fuods are collected; others record deposits at correspondents as demand balaoccs when they make deposits, whether the fnocls will be available for their use immedliately or in a few days. Therefore, adding CIPC to demand balances at correspondents is necessary for getting comparable observations among banks. Member banks that clear cheeks through their Reserve Banks are required to record uncollected funds as CIPC. If these banks were nonmemhers, those CIPC would count as reserve assets. Therefore, these funds are included in the numerator of the ratio in Table V , which shows the extent to which member banks hold do, mImIc reserve assets.
"'See references in footnote 7.
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privilege of Federal Reserve membership which appears to account for retention of membership by the smaller banks is access to a lender of last resort through their Reserve Bank's discount window. That privilege is a type of insurance policy on availability to credit dnring periods of financial difficulty, whether that difficulty occurs within the individual bank or in the whole economy. The cost of membership to a bank can be considered its premium paid for this form of insurance. Since the Federal Reserve has a monopoly on offering the service of lender of last resort, it can charge high premiums for that service, as indicated by the costs of membership calculated above.
There remains the question of why most of the larger banks remain in the Federal Reserve. One possible explanation is that the large member banks use enough Reserve Bank services to more than compensate them for the opportunity costs of the reserve balances they hold. Table IV provides information on this explanation. Dividing the cost to the Reserve Bank of providing services to banks in the largest group by their average reserve balances yields an implicit rate of return of only 1.69 percent. For the three largest banks in the survey, that implicit rate of return is 1.83 percent. As noted above, these figures are understated somewhat because the checks sent by some of these banks directly to other Reserve Banks are not accounted for. But even allowing for that factor, the large member banks receive a low rate of return on their reserve balances in terms of the costs of the services they use. However, membership may still be profitable for the large banks if access to Federal Reserve services allows them to earn large profits as correspondent banks.
These results do not support the view that the larger banks retain their membership in the Federal Reserve because of high implicit returns on their reserve balances. There are too few large banks included in the survey of the utilization of services by member banks to draw strong conclusions about the generality of these results or the reasons why the larger banks retain their membership in the Fed. However, it is unlikely that many of the large member banks receive very high implicit rates of return on their reserves in the form of services, since for the Federal Reserve System as a whole the cost of providing services to member banks is approximately one percent of total reserve balances held by members at Reserve Banks. Therefore, the Federal Reserve is effectively imposing a tax on the banking industry, even with Federal Reserve membership being voluntary. The tax takes the fonn of interest foregone by member banks on their reserve balances less the costs to Reserve Banks of providing services to member banks. At an interest rate of five percent, that tax in 1976 was about $1. billion. 21
An analysis of the costs and benefits of Federal Reserve membership is incomplete without information on the degree to which member banks use the services provided by their Reserve Banks. Member banks with total assets of less than about $50 million make relatively little use of Reserve Bank services, using the services of correspondents instead. There is evidence that the costs of this arrangement to many of the smaller member banks are lower than the costs of managing their reserve accounts if they made fuller use of Reserve Bank services. Member banks making minimal use of Reserve Bank services bear substantial Federal Reserve membership costs, averaging 11.2 percent of profits and 1.8 percent of equity capital for one group of banks.
Most of the major correspondent banks have remained members of the Federal Reserve. The large banks are heavy users of Reserve Bank services, but their implicit returns on reserve balances in the form of services are substantially higher than the implicit returns to the smaller member banks, but are still rather low.
Member bank reserves held at Reserve Banks averaged $26.2 billion in 1976. Suppose the opportunity cost to member banks from holding those reserves is 5 percent, the average yield on U.S. Government Treasury bills last year. The total opportunity cost of holding reserves would be 81.3 billion. With the total costs to Reserve Banks of offering services to member banks between $200 million and $300 million, the total implicit tax on banking was about $1 billion.
